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Abstract
Literature on comparative capitalism remains divided between approaches founded on stylized 
case study evidence and descriptions of broad trends, and those that focus on macro data. In 
contrast, this study explores the relevance of Amable’s approach to understanding differences in 
employment relations practice, based on firm-level micro data. The article examines employee–
employer interdependence (including turnover rates) in different categories of economy as 
classified by Amable. The findings confirm that exit – whether forced or voluntary – remains 
more common in market-based economies than in their continental counterparts and that 
institutionalized employee voice is an important variable in reducing turnover. However, there is 
as much diversity within the different country categories as between them, and across continental 
Europe. In Denmark’s case, high turnover is combined with high unionization, showing the effects 
of a ‘flexicurity’ strategy. While employee voice may be stronger in Scandinavia, interdependence 
is weaker than in continental Europe.
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Introduction
The early literature on comparative capitalism drew a distinction between two arche-
types of developed economies, liberal or stakeholder-orientated market economies and 
coordinated or stakeholder-orientated ones (Dore, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Limitations to this literature included the conflation of many different types of Asian and 
continental European capitalism, and a lack of attention to Mediterranean and Far Eastern 
economies (Amable, 2003; Hancké et al., 2007). A further limitation was the limited 
empirical foundations: much of this work was based on evidence from stylized case stud-
ies and broad brush stroke accounts of differences in the competitiveness of different 
sectors (see Lane and Wood, 2009). In contrast, Amable (2003) identified five different 
types of capitalism. These archetypes are founded on a greater range of empirical evi-
dence, ranging from unions and bargaining coverage to social spending and accounting 
standards. More broadly speaking, Amable (2003) bases his distinctions on macro 
evidence. In contrast, this study explores firm-level survey evidence, and evaluates the 
relevance of Amable’s approach to understanding differences in employee turnover rates 
according to his categories of European economy. Rather than exploring national 
variations in voice, we explore variations in exit and the potential causes thereof.
Employee external turnover, whereby employees leave an employer, has long been a 
subject of considerable concern both for practitioners and HRM (human resource 
management) academics; overly high or low turnover rates are both negative for firm 
efficiency and profitability. High turnover rates reflect a lack of commitment by one or 
both parties; whether voluntary or forced by the organization, high exit rates by employ-
ees may create a self-reinforcing cycle. Although the longer-term consequences of high 
turnover have been little studied, its immediately harmful effects and high costs have 
recently been confirmed (Davidson et al., 2010). More specifically, an environment of 
weak security of tenure mitigates against the development of firm-specific human capi-
tal; a general climate of insecurity will result in employees focusing on developing their 
externally marketable rather than internally relevant skills and knowledge (Harcourt 
and Wood, 2007). Indirect costs include lost production, reduced performance within 
teams, additional overtime and intangible loss of morale among those employees 
remaining (see Harcourt and Wood, 2007). High recruitment costs, especially for very 
skilled workers who might have to be lured by time-consuming processes from other 
employers, may be especially burdensome for employers. In some industries the long 
period of induction required for new employees to acquire firm-specific training and 
become proficient in their roles can also constitute a major problem (Iverson, 1999). 
Moreover, exit (as opposed to voice) is an inherently inefficient mechanism for employ-
ees to express dissatisfaction. Employers may not know the real reason why employees 
choose to leave; no matter how extensive exit interview processes are, employees may 
have their own reasons for giving incomplete or misleading information. Meanwhile, 
employees themselves face inevitable transaction costs in switching jobs.
It is a priori evident that organizational-level collective relations will influence 
employee exit decisions. As Hirschman (1970) points out, the alternative to exit is voice; 
should the latter not be feasible or be weak, then the former represents the only option for 
dissatisfied employees.
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Collective voice is, in most instances, inherently very much stronger than individual 
voice. First, it is harder to disregard or effectively victimize many rather than a few 
(Harcourt et al., 2004). Second, it brings the possibility of collective mobilization to 
redress issues in employees’ favour (Kelly, 1998). Hence, in contexts where institutional-
ized collective voice (trade unions and works councils) is stronger, the need for exit will 
be very much lower. The strength of collective voice may be affected by strategic choices 
by unions, but also by the rights of workers under national law, and embedded informal 
norms, rights and conventions (Marsden, 1999). We therefore regard institutionalized 
collective voice as subject to various influences but also as likely to reduce turnover.
There is an emerging literature on the relative extent of employee voice in different 
capitalist archetypes, based on firm-level micro evidence (Brewster et al., 2007a; 
Goergen et al., 2009). In contrast, we focus here on relative propensity to exit, and other 
indicators of collaboration. The use of firm-level survey/micro evidence enables more 
detailed insights to be gained as to the relationship between context on the one hand, and 
broad firm-level HR policies and practices and staff turnover on the other.
We proceed as follows. In the following section, we argue that models of turnover 
should take account of different approaches to HRM and institutional environments, and 
the extent to which these encourage employer–employee interdependence (Whitley, 
1999). Next, we develop a two-part hypothesis derived from the literature on varieties 
of capitalism, testing them by use of an extensive organizational-level survey of HRM 
practices. Finally, we draw conclusions, confirming that different systems do indeed 
play a major role in determining levels of labour turnover but also showing both the 
diversity existing within the different archetypes and the importance of varying types of 
firm practice.
Employee turnover, forms of HRM and employer–
employee interdependence
Recent research interventions on turnover have emphasized the significance of social 
interactions within the firm. Social exchange theory, although limited in its sphere of 
application, stresses the importance of social factors in the workplace, such as affective 
attachments and feelings of group cohesion and solidarity (Taylor and Pillemer, 2009). 
Akerlof (1982), operating within an economic perspective, demonstrated the impor-
tance of exceptional employer behaviours in reducing employee turnover and raising 
efficiency. Certain employers may establish a ‘gift relationship’ with employees by 
providing them with exceptional benefits that exceed those of their external reference 
groups. This in turn brings a response from employees, who in return make their ‘gift’ 
of greater effort and loyalty to the employer. Interpreted within a broader Weberian 
perspective, the ‘gift relationship’ may also be a way of creating a community or 
Gemeinschaft at the workplace by reference to external ‘normal’ conditions.
Gooderham et al. (1999) identified two principal ways of working within the HRM 
paradigm: ‘calculative’ and ‘collaborative’ HRM. The former stresses the individual and 
seeks to motivate employees primarily by using contingent individualized pay systems 
and monitoring (including appraisal) as suggested by the neoclassical economic model 
and is most likely to be found in Anglo-Saxon economies. The collaborative approach, 
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on the other hand, does not emphasize individualized rewards and overall sends 
employees the message that they are part of a community dedicated to a common goal. 
Communication strategies, most likely to be found in continental European systems, 
were therefore at the centre of the approach. In other words, firms with collaborative 
HRM are more centred on promoting communication as a means for greater organiza-
tional effectiveness, while firms with a calculative approach see employees as a dispos-
able resource, with voluntary or forced exit the desirable mechanism for dealing with the 
business cycle or the dissatisfied.
The closely related distinction between hard and soft HRM is a common one in HRM 
literature and largely reflects different approaches to employee representation and worker 
collectives (Storey, 2007). However, the list of items in Gooderham’s scale does not 
reflect this and is restricted compared to other strands of the literature (Collings and 
Wood, 2009; Rizov and Croucher, 2009; Storey, 2007) that have included further impor-
tant measures of collaborative relations. One of the most important of these is the relative 
strength of collective voice, rather than individually orientated consultation as an indica-
tor of genuine collaboration. A second is the use of group working practices. However, 
related to voice is exit. Strong voice mechanisms for employees may develop employer–
employee interdependence by promoting the view that problems can be solved within the 
enterprise, without recourse to exit (Brewster et al., 2007b; Whitley, 1999). Conversely, 
an inability to impact on employment and work relations is likely to erode organizational 
commitment and hence encourage higher staff turnover rates; if voice is unfeasible, then 
exit is likely to become more prevalent (Harcourt and Wood, 2007; Storey, 2007).
Collaborative relations are also in evidence if, through greater security of tenure, the 
workplace is conducive to human capital development; workers have a greater incentive 
to develop firm-specific skills if they know they will be staying with the firm for a consid-
erable period of time (Harcourt and Wood, 2007). In turn, collaborative relationships are 
associated with high levels of managerial trust in employees and therefore a tendency to 
delegate control over the productive process to workers and to collectives (Whitley, 1999). 
This also reduces the need for costly employee monitoring systems (Rizov and Croucher, 
2009), reflecting complementarities between specific sets of rules and practices.
While insecure tenure and a ready recourse to redundancies can reflect unforeseen 
external pressures, firms that make use of such ‘harder’ measures for adjusting work-
force sizes are also more likely to treat human capabilities as a readily dispensable and 
substitutable resource (Redman and Wilkinson, 2006). Turnover rates may themselves 
directly reflect the use of redundancies, since they represent forced exit. However, turn-
over rates also represent the outcome of real choices by employees, who believe that 
their futures are better advanced externally rather than within the firm.
The situation is summarized in Table 1.
Comparative capitalism, voice and exit
A large body of the literature on comparative capitalism suggests that there is likely to be 
a close relationship between national systems, HRM practice and the extent to which 
organizations and employees are committed to each other (Dore, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 
2001). The relationship is both a direct and an indirect one; not only are individual 
employment rights likely be stronger under the law and convention in more collaboratively 
 at Middlesex University on May 22, 2013eid.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Croucher et al. 5
oriented economies, but so are collective rights. In turn, collective voice rights and 
mechanisms are likely to deter firms from treating employees simply as a disposable 
asset, and provide employees with more viable alternatives to exit (Harcourt et al., 2004; 
Hirschman, 1970).
We adopt Amable’s (2003) more differentiated categorization of countries, rather 
than the dichotomous approaches favoured by the early literature on comparative 
capitalism, focusing on three of Amable’s archetypes: market-based, continental and 
social democratic.
Continental European and social democratic economies (the latter based in 
Scandinavia) share certain core features. Both are associated with greater degrees of 
collaboration with employees in setting policies and practices regarding the social 
organization of work, higher degrees of employment security and an emphasis on longer-
term relationships between companies, customers, suppliers and employees (Amable, 
2003; Brookes et al., 2005). These are likely to reduce the attractiveness of turnover as 
an employee option by, inter alia, encouraging a long-term of view of the employment 
relationship and affective membership of the firm perceived as a community. Continental 
and social democratic economies also tend to have more influential national labour 
movements. These combine with in-company employee representative arrangements to 
ensure effective regulation. For example, in the German case, paradigmatic for the con-
tinental model, a combination of trade unions external to the firm operates in tandem 
with internal works councils. In this system, trade unions tend to externalize major conflict 
from the firm itself, by conducting key negotiations on pay at industry level. Consequently, 
they organize work stoppages to exert pressure on employers at multi-employer level, 
allowing workplace representatives to ascribe conflict to the industry’s employers in 
general. Thus, relations at firm level may remain cooperative despite major industrial 
conflict. Meanwhile, minor issues inside the firm are dealt with by strong legally 
supported works councils (Schröder and Wessels, 2003). All employees are entitled to 
such representation, which may be initiated on employee request (Schröder and Wessels, 
2003). In this way, employee voice is, within the continental model, institutionalized as 
comprehensive for all employees and the exit option made less attractive. Significantly 
for our discussion, continental economies also have strong inter-employer links through 
Table 1. Delegation and interdependence
Delegation Interdependence
+ +
1. Devolved control over productive processes. 1. Low staff turnover rates
2. Collective voice mechanisms
    • Works councils
    • Collective bargaining
 
− −
1. Close monitoring of performance
    • Appraisals
    • Contingent pay
1. High staff turnover rates
    •  Forced forms of workplace restructuring 
(e.g. redundancies, early retirement) 
    • Voluntary choices by employees
From: Amable, 2003; Brewster et al., 2007b; Whitley, 1999.
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employers’ associations and industry-wide pay bargaining that tend by standardizing pay 
to reduce incentives for employees to move employer within given industries. In market-
based economies, by contrast, pay is normally bargained at company level, potentially 
generating firm-based conflict and allowing for much stronger inter-company competi-
tion for labour (Whitley, 1999).
The social democratic system is associated with particularly strong trade unions, 
underpinned by their current or historic associations with the administration of unem-
ployment benefits. These benefits remain relatively high when compared to all other 
forms of capitalism, but are combined with only moderate levels of employment protec-
tion, mitigated through ready access to training to ensure individuals have access to 
skills that will make for security in being able to secure jobs, with a broader emphasis 
on labour market flexibility (Amable, 2003). Thus, different factors operate in contrary 
directions in relation to turnover: while strong unions promote voice, other parts of the 
system encourage turnover. It is not therefore entirely clear how the model will perform 
when compared to the market-based and continental variants.
These systems have undoubtedly experienced external pressure to change. Firms 
operating within continental economies have been faced with demands for greater cost 
cutting in the face of intensified international competition, while elites seem increasingly 
willing to challenge long-standing social compromises, raising the question as to whether 
national institutional features remain distinctive (Boyer, 2006; Lane, 2000; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005). Arguably, the power of national institutions to influence firm-level 
practices can be overstated. In Germany, for example, the uneven institutional coverage 
(reflected in the ‘co-determination free zone’ for example) has made for a degree of 
internal systemic diversity (Allen, 2004: 89). Similarly, the tendency for firms to try to 
escape strong labour market regulation has, as we remarked above, resulted in the 
externalization of much employment.
Hypotheses
Following our discussion in the previous section, two hypotheses are explored. The 
earlier section clearly leads to the conclusion that firms in continental and social 
democratic economies operate within an environment more conducive to developing 
collaborative relationships between employers and employees. Firms operating within 
them are more likely to pursue policies that encourage such approaches. Consequently, 
there will be stronger commitment from both sides. Hence:
H1: Firms operating in non-market-based systems will have lower turnover rates than those in 
market-based systems.
Somewhat more difficult to predict is the relationship between continental European 
and the Scandinavian social democratic economies. On the one hand, in Scandinavia rela-
tively strong unions and systemically embedded employee representation mechanisms 
are likely to make for relatively strong employee voice, embedding viable alternatives to 
exit. On the other hand, weaker employment protection under the law makes it easier for 
firms in the Scandinavian social democracies to adjust workforce sizes downwards for 
operational reasons, and, indeed, to eject workers for poor performance. Hence:
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H2: Employment turnover is likely to be higher in the social democratic countries of 
Scandinavia, despite strong firm-level employee voice.
Method
Our data are extracted from the most recent presently available Cranet dataset, an inter-
national firm-level survey of HRM practices conducted at regular intervals since 1989 
across a large number of countries by a well-established international HRM research 
network. The latest round of the survey, from which our data are drawn, was conducted 
in 2009–10, and represents the best data available on HRM practices at firm level in 
Europe. An alternative exists in the form of the European Industrial Relations 
Observatory’s surveys for 2004 and 2009. However, these data are not oriented primarily 
on HRM practices, but more on issues of quality of working life, social dialogue and 
other issues of concern to the European Union. They are therefore less suitable for our 
purposes than the Cranet data. Cranet data nevertheless pose one issue. Since large firms 
are over-represented in the dataset, we control for size effects in our analysis. We expect 
larger firms to experience higher rates of turnover due to the difficulties posed in making 
employees feel an attachment to a larger organization.
The Cranet survey is administered as follows. The most senior HRM manager in each 
firm is asked a comprehensive set of questions about the firm and its HRM practices, 
which are determined by the network (Tregaskis et al., 2004). These questions are trans-
lated into the relevant language and then back-translated into English to confirm their 
validity. The questionnaire is administered by post. Full technical details of the survey 
are provided in Tregaskis et al. (2004).
The allocation of specific countries to country groupings is recognized by all operat-
ing within an institutionalist paradigm to be problematic. In our case, we adopt a catego-
rization that largely follows Amable’s groupings, but where economies occupy an 
ambiguous position we allocate them according to the level of unionization and employer 
organization in companies operating within their borders. We do so because those factors 
appear, as we argued above, especially relevant to the level of turnover. We use the UK 
and USA to represent market-based economies, both of which have low rates of unioni-
zation and employer organization in their private sectors; our subsequent results con-
firmed the relevance of this categorization. We use Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Austria and Slovenia to represent the continental economies (all of which have moderate 
to high levels of unionization and employer organization in their private sectors). 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway are taken to represent the social democratic economies 
(all have high levels of unionization and employer organization in their private sectors). 
While Norway is categorized by Amable as a continental economy, it has relatively high 
union density and organized employers when compared to Germany. Amable also recog-
nizes its ambiguous position and we allocate it to the social democratic grouping on the 
grounds that it has a relatively high level of unionization and union influence more widely. 
Indeed, its labour market and welfare net more closely resemble other Scandinavian 
economies. Significantly, Norway has, as is the case with Denmark, experimented with 
‘flexicurity’ policies. Table 2 lists the countries encompassed by the study.
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Analysis
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, average annual staff turnover is estimated as 
a function of size, sector, industry and variety of capitalism as well as a number of 
variables indicating the presence of policies likely to promote or discourage collabora-
tive practices. The size of the organization, which may also be relevant to the level of 
turnover, is measured by the number of employees.
Dummy variables are included to control for differences in sector, industry and 
economy type, with the reference category being a domestically owned, private sector 
metal manufacturing company located in a market-based economy. Sector is included 
since it is likely that the nature of the relationship between employers and employees will 
differ between sectors (Brewster et al., 2007a). It is also likely that public sector organi-
zations will be more collaboratively focused. However, the emphasis in most developed 
nations over the last 20 or 30 years on increasing public sector accountability and cost 
effectiveness may have blurred the distinction between the public and private sectors 
(Ferner, 2002). It is also important to control for inter-industry differences since the 
turnover rate is likely to be altered by specific types of production processes within an 
industry, the type of labour input into those processes and the quality of work (see Boyer 
and Hollingsworth, 1997; Harcourt and Wood, 2007). Therefore, 15 industry dummies, 
taken from the European Union NACE categories, are included.
Variables are also included as indicators of the firm’s commitment to developing 
more collaborative approaches, as well as a reflection of the extent of interdependence 
between employers and employees (Whitley, 1999). A probabilistic scale for perfor-
mance appraisal, reflecting the coverage of appraisals across different categories of 
employees within the firm, is included as an explanatory variable along with a dummy 
indicating that the firm has made use of outsourcing in the last three years. The premise 
here is that reliance upon either of these policies reflects more calculative HR practices, 
and that therefore their use is likely to increase the staff turnover rate.
Table 2. List of countries
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Dummy variables are included for firms making use of a recruitment freeze, 
redeployment or outsourcing (but not redundancies) as well as for those having a joint 
consultative committee or works council and/or collective bargaining over pay above 
the establishment level, i.e. at the national, regional or company level. The expectation 
is that each of these is likely to foster a stronger relationship between the firm and its 
employees. The proportion of employees who are members of a trade union is also 
included as an explanatory variable. It is anticipated that firms with a greater propor-
tion of union members are likely to have lower turnover because of the greater voice 
possibilities. Table 3 summarizes the variables and their definitions.
Table 3. Variables and definitions
Variable name Variable definition
Size Natural log of number of employees in 
organization
Public/private sector Public sector organization (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Industrial sector Fifteen industry dummies, as listed below, with
metal manufacturing as the reference category
Economies
Liberal market economies
Dummy variables identifying different economies:
when they are grouped by economy type the
Scandinavian liberal market economies are the reference
Continental category and when the countries are entered










Collaborative factors  
Performance appraisal scale Probabilistic Mokken scale reflecting the use of
 performance appraisals and the different types
 of employees covered
Outsourcing Outsourcing used to lower staff nos in last 3 
years
Recruitment freeze Recruitment freeze during last 3 years
Redeployment Redeployment used to lower staff nos in last 3 
years
Collective bargaining Collective bargaining over pay takes place
JCC/works council A JCC or works council is present.
% Trade union members The % of employees who are union members
Dependent variable The annual turnover rate expressed as a % of the
Turnover total workforce
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Findings
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics by economy type for the key variables in the analy-
sis and the stylized facts relating to the types of capitalism are confirmed at least at an 
observational level. The staff turnover rate is clearly lower in the continental and social 
democratic types, the prevalence of those factors conducive to interdependence is higher 
and those not conducive lower.
However, before anything authoritative can be said about differential turnover rates, 
those differences need to be mediated by the other determining factors. Table 5 records 
the results from estimating the model of the staff turnover rate outlined in the earlier 
section by OLS.
The control variables generally have the anticipated impact, with larger firms having 
higher turnover rates and public sector organizations having lower turnover rates. In 
addition, there is some evidence of cross-industry differences: a few industries, most 
notably retail, have significantly higher turnover rates than the metal manufacturing ref-
erence category.
Turning to the formal hypotheses, the dummy variable for the continental economies 
is negative and significant, and once the model is controlled for size, sector and industry, 
clear differences in the relative turnover rates between these and market-based econo-
mies remain in evidence. However, the dummy for social democratic economies is insig-
nificant, suggesting that these types of economy are not too dissimilar from the 
market-based economy reference category; this is likely to reflect the larger proportion 
of Scandinavian economies that have adopted flexicurity measures than continental 
European ones. As a result, our data at this stage provide only partial support for the first 
hypothesis.
The model is then re-estimated, to further interrogate our second hypothesis, with 
individual country dummies replacing the variety of capitalism proxies. This is also very 
informative since it reveals that Denmark is an outlier within the social democratic 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of key variables
Total LME Scandinavian Continental
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent variable
% Annual staff turnover 9.4 8.65 11.95 9.36 7.11 7.43 10.62 8.87
Collaborative factors
Performance appraisal scale 58.28 39.82 79.22 26.29 60.73 38.4 37.35 41.02
Outsourcing 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.29
Recruitment freeze 0.23 0.42 0.3 0.46 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39
Redeployment 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.2 0.4 0.21 0.41
Collective bargaining 0.79 0.4 0.71 0.45 0.8 0.4 0.85 0.35
JCC/works council 0.67 0.47 0.3 0.46 0.76 0.43 0.85 0.35
% Trade union members 38.41 33.67 13.98 25.19 33.68 30.24 65.56 24.56
Observations 1697 429 751 517  
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Table 5. OLS model of staff turnover rate
Variable Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Mean
Constant 6.628*** 6.16 5.850*** 5.39  
Size
Natural log of total 
employees
0.596*** 4.42 0.726*** 5.39 6.197
Public/private sector
Public sector organization −1.736*** −2.74 −1.237** −1.98 0.231
Industrial sector
Agriculture −0.053 −0.03 −0.482 −0.30 0.015
Energy and water −1.366 −1.32 −1.313 −1.34 0.043
Chemical products −0.775 −0.68 −0.762 −0.69 0.034
Building and civil 
engineering
2.340** 2.18 1.936* 1.83 0.038
Retail and distribution 7.968*** 8.02 6.896*** 7.12 0.047
Transport and 
communication
2.281** 2.39 1.632* 1.76 0.052
Banking, finance and 
insurance
2.038*** 2.80 1.376* 1.94 0.111
Personal, domestic and 
recreational services
4.762** 2.02 4.056* 1.77 0.007
Health services 2.513*** 2.42 2.214** 2.18 0.044
Other services 3.687*** 3.50 4.023*** 3.94 0.042
Education 0.487 0.51 0.263 0.28 0.063
Social services 2.495* 1.71 1.906 1.34 0.020
Public administration 0.428 0.46 0.106 0.12 0.096
Other 2.649*** 3.89 2.097*** 3.08 0.141
Economies
Scandinavian 0.728 1.01 0.305
Continental −4.017*** −6.95 0.443
Denmark 4.854*** 5.72 0.143
Norway −2.367** −2.22 0.052
Sweden −0.574 −0.62 0.109
Austria −1.786* −1.90 0.079
Germany −5.990*** −7.84 0.151
Netherlands −2.304** −2.22 0.045
Belgium −2.642*** −2.75 0.064
Slovenia −1.880** −2.16 0.102
UK 1.409 1.52 0.059
Collaborative factors
Performance appraisal scale 0.008 1.55 0.010* 1.80 58.283
Outsourcing −0.721 −0.10 −0.039 −0.05 0.119
Recruitment freeze 0.533 0.45 0.835 1.22 0.231
Redeployment −0.264 −0.35 −0.439 −0.61 0.212
Collective bargaining 0.896* 1.78 0.593 1.19 0.794
(Continued)
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grouping. Denmark has clearly had an effect on the collective results; the country is also 
a relatively advanced example of flexicurity. It has a well-developed and integrated 
system which links high levels of social security with flexibility, active labour market 
approaches and involvement of the social partners (Bredgaard et al., 2005). The second 
hypothesis posits that the continental and social democratic economies will differ and 
this is supported since the continental economies show less turnover then the social 
democratic. We also note the significant level of internal variation within the country 
groupings, which is as important as that between them.
Discussion and conclusion
This article has explored the relationship between a range of capitalist archetypes, and 
employer–employee interdependence using comparative firm-level survey evidence. 
The findings broadly correspond to existing literature founded on macro-economic and 
associated data, confirming the utility of their national-level institutional approach (see 
Amable, 2003).
A limitation of the research is that it is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. We 
therefore have insufficient evidence to conclude that a key defining difference between 
these forms – commitment between employers and employees – has not been subject 
to change. The most recent literature on comparative capitalism has emphasized the 
dynamism of different national archetypes, the non-linear nature of change and the 
possibilities of internal diversity within and hybridization between systems (Boyer, 
2006; Lane and Wood, 2009).
First among the article’s findings, we would highlight the central finding that exit – 
whether forced or voluntary – remains more common in market-based economies than in 
their continental counterparts. Our hypotheses posited that the three types of capitalism 
would have different levels of turnover. The survey indeed found a persistent difference 
between varieties of capitalism, not only in terms of the relatively narrow range of indi-
ces identified by Gooderham et al. (1999), but indeed across a wider and complementary 
range of practices identified by other researchers (Rizov and Croucher, 2009) that would 
be likely to promote or deter collaborative policies in the workplace, significantly 
impacting job turnover rates. The social democratic economies showed turnover more 
akin to that in the market-based economies than to that in their continental counterparts. 
Variable Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Mean
JCC/works council −1.014** −1.96 −0.933* −1.78 0.672
% Trade union members −0.275*** −3.42 −0.038*** −4.60 38.414
Dependent variable Turnover Turnover  
Mean 9.401 9.401  
Standard deviation 8.650 8.650  
Observations 1697 1697  
 R2 0.15 0.21  
Table 5. (Continued)
 at Middlesex University on May 22, 2013eid.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Croucher et al. 13
Despite high levels of unionization, Denmark shows high levels of turnover. This would 
reflect the relatively advanced nature of flexicurity in Denmark, and indeed, its proximity 
to and absorption of aspects of the Norwegian system. This finding resolves the question 
of which aspects of the social democratic system were most influential in affecting 
turnover in favour of those promoting external flexibility, and highlighting the limita-
tions of dichotomous approaches to capitalist diversity.
Interestingly, while interdependence is lower in the Scandinavian social democracies 
than in continental Europe, union voice is stronger (see Goergen et al., 2009). This high-
lights the complex nature of complementarities, and the limitations of approaches that 
see worker rights as comprising a coherent body of mutually supporting practices. What 
this study highlights is that workers enjoy different types of rights in different settings 
rather than less or more of the same thing according to context. More specifically, while 
unions are relatively strong in Scandinavia, in countries such as Denmark their strength 
has gone hand in hand with weaker job security. In contrast, jobs remain more secure in 
a number of continental European economies where union membership has declined.
These are in themselves significant findings. For the reasons noted earlier, voice tends 
to be a more effective mechanism for expressing concerns than exit, and imposes fewer 
costs on both parties. Whatever the benefits of a high degree of external flexibility, it 
undermines the possibility of complementarities based on longer-term employer–
employee commitment, including the more effective exchange of information through 
the development of social capital. Moreover, information sharing is in many industries 
the key to sustained competitive advantage and has been conclusively demonstrated to 
raise organizational performance (Minbaeva et al., 2003; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
These studies show how information sharing is linked to the development of social 
capital in enterprises. While identification of the precise mechanisms involved in the 
development of social capital remains a collective work in progress for the research com-
munity, its development certainly relies on a degree of sociological continuity in the 
workplace. Hence, we would argue that this aspect of the continued differences between 
the different forms of capitalism remains important, despite the uneven attention it 
receives in different strands of the literature on comparative capitalism.
Some interesting results emerged in terms of the specific countries within the catego-
rizations. First, Denmark was a clear outlier in that it showed very different and much 
higher turnover, which strongly influenced the results in the social democratic category. 
This tends to lend support to those who have argued that, particularly because of major 
labour market reforms in recent years, Denmark shares important characteristics with the 
market-driven model (see, for example, Kvist and Pedersen, 2007). It may be that the 
strong support for institutional partnership between the various social partners preserves 
strong safety nets that mitigate a high degree of labour market flexibility. Norway shows 
results that are very similar to those for Sweden, providing some retrospective justifica-
tion for our decision to include Norway in the social democratic grouping. Germany, on 
the other hand, and despite long-standing arguments that it is moving inexorably in 
a market-based direction (see, for example, Lane, 2000), showed results that were very 
much at the other end of the spectrum when it comes to security of tenure. If the German 
model is eroding as many argue that it is, it appears nevertheless to continue to generate 
considerable employer–employee interdependence, even if voice – and more broadly 
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speaking, delegation – may be weakening (see Whitley, 1999). The contrast with the 
Austrian case, with which it may sometimes be aggregated in a ‘Germanic’ category, is 
marked in our results.
Thus, there are significant differences not only between varieties of capitalism, but 
also within them, and we found this internal diversity to be at least as important as that 
between varieties. Clearly no categorization is complete; while Amable’s five-archetype 
model provides a far better explanation than earlier dichotomous approaches, any use 
of ideal types masks important differences in practices at firm level. At the same time, 
the fact that the study did not find ‘diffuse diversity’ within which a very wide range of 
practices exists within a given archetype, suggests that the categorizations retain some 
validity.
We found that high union density and the existence of joint consultative committees 
and works councils both tended to reduce turnover. This lends support to our initial 
argument that while individual psychological aspects of turnover have their analytic 
place, the institutional voice framework is also relevant. However, some institutional 
settings appeared more conducive to promoting delegation and others interdependence. 
Our finding underlines their continued importance as institutional bulwarks against 
high levels of turnover.
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